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Non-technical summary
Financing is a crucial but scarce factor especially in technology-oriented industries where
the risk of failure is high and information asymmetries are substantial, e.g. because
the marketplace for the new and innovative products is unclear. Particularly young
technology-based firms are often perceived to lack capital. Hence, debt investors may
generally be reluctant to invest in this type of firm so that entrepreneurs often need to
rely on equity financing, e.g. on venture capital (VC).
This paper tries to shed light into the link between venture capital financing and firms’
innovation activities. We reflect innovation activities by using two different variables:
Patent counts and an index on firm’s innovativeness of the technology applied. The
data set was generated by a computer-assisted telephone survey for which over 1,000
young firms in technology-oriented service and manufacturing sectors were called. The
firms have been founded between 1996 and 2005. The data contains information on the
characteristics of the founder team, the firm and innovation indicators.
Analyzing the role of VC for financing innovative young firms has to deal with potential
endogeneity of VC financing. In order to account for endogeneity we use full-information
maximum likelihood (FIML) methods which simultaneously handle the objective func-
tion and an endogeneity-correcting equation. We confirm that VC financing positively
contributes to young firms’ innovation activities in high-tech industries.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Finanzierung ist ein wichtiger aber knapper Faktor vor allem in Hochtechnologiesek-
toren, in denen das Risiko und die Informationsasymmetrie besonders ausgepra¨gt sind,
z.B. aufgrund des schwer einzuscha¨tzenden Marktpotenzials der Produkte. Insbeson-
dere junge Unternehmen zeichnen sich durch nicht gedeckten Kapitalbedarf aus. Oft ist
Fremdkapital fu¨r diese Unternehmen nicht zu erhalten, so dass sie oft auf Eigenkapital-
finanzierung zuru¨ckgreifen mu¨ssen, z.B. auf Venture-Capital(VC)-Investitionen.
Dieses Papier versucht Evidenz fu¨r den Zusammenhang zwischen VC-Finanzierung
und Innovationsaktivita¨ten von Unternehmen zu finden. Innovationsta¨tigkeit wird hi-
erbei durch zwei Indikatoren abgebildet: Einerseits u¨ber das Vorliegen von Patentan-
meldungen und andererseits u¨ber einen Innovativita¨ts-Index. Der Datensatz beruht
auf computergestu¨tzten Telefoninterviews unter mehr als 1.000 jungen Unternehmen
in technologieorientierten Sektoren im Verarbeitenden und Dienstleistungsgewerbe, die
zwischen 1996 und 2005 gegru¨ndet wurden. Der Datensatz liefert Informationen zu
Eingenschaften des Gru¨ndungsteams, des Unternehmens und zu Innovationsindikatoren.
Um kausale Effekte zu erhalten, muss fu¨r die mo¨gliche Endogenita¨t von VC-Finanzierung
korrigiert werden. Hierbei stu¨tzen wir uns auf Full-information-maximum-likelihood(FIML)-
Methoden: In simultanen Scha¨tzverfahren werden die interessierende Gleichung und
eine endogenita¨tskorrigierende Gleichung gescha¨tzt. Die Ergebnisse besta¨tigen, dass
VC-Finanzierung einen positiven Einfluss auf Innovationsaktivita¨ten von jungen High-
tech-Unternehmen hat.
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Abstract
This paper examines the role of venture capital on a firm’s innovation activities
by using a data set of German technology-based firms founded between 1996 and
2005. Innovation is proxied by patent counts and an index of innovativeness which
reflects the degree to which a young firm has developed new technologies based on
its own or external resources. The results show that VC financing has a positive
impact on both patenting and innovativeness, even if we account for endogeneity
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1 Introduction
Financing is a crucial input factor to corporate innovation activities (hottenrott???).
However, innovation is characterized by a high level of uncertainty. For example, Stevens
and Burley (1997) estimate that on average 3,000 raw ideas are tried and tested to get
one major commercially successful innovation. Consequently, innovations often show a
considerable variance in terms of time involved and money spent, and hence present a
process which is difficult to predict. Furthermore, substantial information asymmetries
exist for external capital providers so that internal financing is often viewed to be the
most adequate source of funding innovation activities (see Hall(2002, 2005), Harhoff
(1998), Himmelberg, Petersen (1994)). However, young technology-oriented firms mostly
lack enough internal funds and need to rely on external financing. Venture capital (VC)
is supposed to play a major role in the financing of young innovative firms and is often
perceived to spur innovation. Anecdotal evidence particularly exists for the U.S., since
many of today’s big players in innovative markets, like computer or biotechnology, have
been VC-financed in their early stages (see e.g. Apple, Microsoft and Genentech). At the
beginning, they were characterized by high risk and a potential to generate high returns.
Within the first years after their emergence, they were able to grow substantially in
terms of employment and gained a leading position in the generation of new knowledge
and markets.
This paper empirically investigates the impact of VC investment on firms’ innovation
activities. Seminal studies investigating the link between firms’ innovation activities and
VC financing provide evidence on the industry level for the U.S. (see Kortum, Lerner,
1998, 2000). They report a positive impact of VC financing on innovation activities. This
paper provides evidence for young German firms in technology-oriented industries. First
we look at patenting behavior as an approximation for innovation activities. However,
the literature discusses whether patents are good proxies for innovation activities (see
e.g. Griliches et al. (1987)). In order to expand the notion innovation activities beyond
patenting activities we use an alternative variable which measures innovativeness in
terms of the degree of novelty of the technologies applied by firms and its developer.
Empirical analyses of VC investments in firms usually suffer from endogeneity prob-
lems which may arise because of the selectivity of the VC investment process. Most
studies in this field do not account for this issue. But ignoring it only reveals correla-
tions but no causalal relations. Hence, a major contribution of this paper is to provide
causal evidence for the link between VC investment and innovation activities. There-
fore, we use techniques which enable us to solve the endogeneity problem. We use
full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) methods to account for this issue. These
methodologies are constructed such that they simultaneously estimate an objective func-
tion, e.g. for innovation activities, and an endogeneity-correcting function. The methods
are explained in Section ??.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on VC’s impact
on innovation. In Section 3.1 the hypotheses tested in this paper are derived. Section
3.2 presents the data set and depicts some descriptive statistics. Section 4 shows the
empirical models and results. Endogeneity issues are discussed in Section ??, and Section
5 concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review
As a consequence of the intangibility of the innovation process’ outcome, the limited
collateral value of technology investments, the higher default risk and the limited inter-
nal funds (Carpenter, Petersen (2002), Carpentier, Suret (2005), Berger, Udell (1998),
Fritsch et al. (2006)) young technology-oriented firms have difficulties in accessing debt
financing. Hence, they often need to finance their innovation activities using external
equity sources. VC investors are one group of equity providers. Beyond capital, VC
companies are assumed to provide management support which is supposed to be partic-
ularly crucial for young technology-oriented firms because founders of this type of firms
are assumed not to be good managers because of their primarily technical backgrounds
(Cressy, Hall (2005), Moore (1994)).
Many of the studies investigating the link between venture capital financing and in-
novation analyze effects on the industry level. Kortum and Lerner (1998, 2000) test
whether venture capital spurs innovation activity. They estimate a patent production
function at the industry level similar to Griliches (1979) and find a positive and signifi-
cant effect of venture financing on the number of patent grants. However, Kortum and
Lerner (2000) suspect that venture capital may spur patenting while having no impact
on innovation and analyze this effect by comparing indicators of patent quality between
VC- and non-VC-backed firms. They account for technological and economic impor-
tance of the patents by using patent citations (see Trajtenberg, 1990) and the frequency
and extent of patent litigation (see Lanjouw and Schankerman, 1997). For both mea-
sures of patent quality, they find that VC-backed firms hold higher quality patents than
non-VC-backed firms, and conclude that VC financing has an impact on innovation.
Tykvova` (2000) confirms a positive influence of venture capital on patent application at
the industry level for Germany using a similar approach than Kortum and Lerner.
However, Ueda and Hirukawa (2003) state that the opposite causality may also exist
and argue that opportunities for firms to innovate and/or grow fast will lead to an
augmented demand for venture capital and hence lead to growth of the venture capital
market. Using the growth of total factor productivity as a measure for innovation they
find that the complementarity of innovation and venture capital investments does not
only stem from the positive impact of VC investments on innovation but also from the
positive impact of innovation on VC investment.
As Lerner (2002) states the impact of venture capital on innovation is not uniform
and depends on the cyclicality of the VC market. Extending the studies by Kortum and
Lerner to the growth period of the VC industry during the late 1990s Ueda and Hirukawa
(2006) confirm the results of Kortum and Lerner However, they could not verify their
previous results as they find no significant effect on TFP growth.
The effects of VC financing on innovation activities using firm-level data reveals in
many studies a positive and significant effect. Bretoni et al. (2006) find a highly positive
effect of VC financing on firm’s patenting activities for new technology-based firms in
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Italy. Hellmann and Puri (2000) state that the time to market is shorter if venture
capital is present in the firm, particularly if the firm follows an innovator strategy for
startups in Silicon Valley.
Da Rin and Penas’ (2007) results suggest that VC financing has an impact on inno-
vation strategies, since the entry of a VC investor is associated with higher absorptive
capacity reflected by an increase in the firm’s make decision.
Timmons and Bygrave (1986) investigate the role of venture capital in financing inno-
vation for economic growth. They study 464 venture-capital firms and find that less than
5 % of them account for nearly 25 % of all investments in highly innovative technological
ventures. Their most important result is that it is not the provided capital that fosters
technological innovation but the nonmonetary, high value-added contributions.
Baum and Silverman (2004) find no significant effect in Canadian biotechnology for VC
spurring innovation activities of start-ups. On the contrary, they find that the amount of
pre-IPO financing is positively affected by patents in the year before financing. Hence,
their results suggest that patenting is a signal of innovative capabilities and prospective
return to investors.
Other papers at the firm level find the reverse causality. Haeussler et al. (2009) find
that patent applications reduce the time to the first VC investment and interpret their
find as evidence that patents are able to certificate quality to VC investors. Hence,
VC investors respond to patenting activity. Engel and Keilbach (2007) state that the
number of patent applications is higher for VC-funded firms than for non-VC-financed
firms prior to the investment. This effect, however, vanishes looking at the differences
after the investment (see also Caselli et al. (2008)). Hence, VC investors seem to rather
focus on the commercialization than on cutting edge innovation.
These results in the literature with the unexplained direction of causality show that
endogeneity is a problem when studying the relation between firms’ innovation activities
and the fact that they receive VC financing.
3 Research Strategy
3.1 Hypotheses
This paper investigates the impact of VC financing on firms’ innovation activities looking
at young German firms in technology oriented sectors. There may be two reasons why
VC funds may spur firm’s innovation activities: First, VC investors provide funds, and
thus help firms to bridge their funding gap. Since innovation projects are costly and
time demanding the provision of funds help young technology-oriented firms to dedicate
more money and time in their innovation projects which may positively contribute to the
success of those projects. Second, VC investors also provide management support, and
their advice is supposed to be useful because they generally are equipped with industry
and technology experience. Hence, VC investors may be able to push firms in specific,
more promising fields of research.
Patent counts is our first indicator for innovation activities. The following equation
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roughly illustrates the assumed relation between VC investment and firms’ patenting
Pi = f(V Ci, controls),
where Pi reflects the counts of patent grants and V Ci indicates whether the firms has
received VC funds. The corresponding hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1: Venture Capital spurs firm’s patenting behavior.
Griliches, Pakes and Hall (1987) discuss some problems that arise when relying on
patent counts as an indicator for innovative activities: Patents differ in size and/or
value, not all R&D activities are patentable or patented, and the fraction patented
varies across industry, firm and time. Furthermore, as patents also disclose the newly
generated knowledge firms may retain from patenting (Anton, Yao (2004), Heger, Zaby
(2013)).
Additionally, Kortum and Lerner (2000) point out that venture capital may spur
patenting while having no impact on innovation. Hence, we try to capture another as-
pect of innovation activities by using a new variable. Like patents this variable still looks
at the result of an innovation process but tries to capture the spectrum of firms’ inno-
vation activities. This innovativeness indicator is a categorical variable which displays
the degree of newness as well as the extent to which a young firm has developed new
technologies based on own resources (for definition see Table 1).
We argue that VC funding provides firms with more time to and with new triggers for
their innovation activities. Hence, we suppose that VC-financed firms should be enabled
to develop new methods and technologies as they bridge their funding gap and receive
(technical) guidance by VC investors. A simple illustration of the conjectured link is
represented by the following equation:
Ii = f(V Ci, controls)
,
where Ii is the categorical variable innovativeness, V Ci is again VC investment. A
positive impact of V Ci is particularly expected for the category of self-developed new
technologies. The corresponding hypothesis is the following:
Hypothesis 2: Firms are more likely to develop the methods and technologies they
use to build their products themselves if they are VC-backed.
3.2 Data set and variable description
The data we use for investigating the impact of VC funding on firms’ innovation activities
is the ZEW Technology Start-ups Survey 2006 which is a telephone survey of German
technology-oriented firms founded between 1996 and 2005. The survey sample was drawn
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from the ZEW Enterprise Panel provided regualarly by Creditreform, Germany’s largest
credit rating agency. The sample was stratified by foundation periods and sectors. The
survey targets technology sectors following the classifications of Grupp et al. (2000)
for manufacturing and Engel and Steil (1999) and Nerlinger (1998) for service sectors.
Foundation periods have been clustered into two groups: founded between 1996 and
2000 and between 2001 and 2005, which represent the boom and the post-boom period
in high-tech industries in Germany. Interviews were carried out in February and March
2006. The persons interviewed were either owners or executives. Altogether, 6,315 firms
have been contacted within the pre-defined survey period of three weeks. 1,085 interviews
could be completed, thus the response rate was 17 %.
We merge patent information from the PATSTAT data up to the year 2006 in order
to capture the innovative output of the firms. We consider European and German
priorities. Information on stakeholders, location and credit rating is taken from the ZEW
Enterprise Panel. The distance to the nearest university or public research institution
was calculated based on ZIP code areas to account for possible spillovers. Table 2 depicts
the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the regressions below.
Two different dependent variables are used to test the hypotheses: the number of
patents applied after firm foundation and innovativeness (see Table 1). The average
firm has applied for 0.41 patents (patents). The fractions of the different categories of
innovativeness (innovativeness) are displayed in Table 1. The index refers to the top-
selling product of a firm. It is possible that innovative firms with more than one product
may indicate that their top-selling one is not innovative. However, as young, small firms
usually produce a small number of products this issue should not be severe.
Table 1: Characteristics of the variable innovativeness
cat. The product is characterized by. . . Fraction
3 . . . new methods and technologies developed by the firm itself 46.7%
2 . . . new methods and technologies developed by a third party 25.0 %
1 . . . a new combination of tried and tested methods and technologies 16.3 %
0 . . . a known combination of tried and tested methods and technologies 12.0 %
The key explanatory variable of interest is venture capital, a dummy variable, indicat-
ing whether the firm has received venture capital financing. The descriptives statistics
of this and the following variables can be found in Table 2
< Insert Table 2 about here. >
We control for different types of potential impact factors with respect to corporate
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innovation activities. We group these factors according to the firm’s product strategy
regarding the innovation, the characteristics of the founding team and general firm char-
acteristics.
Regarding the firm’s product strategy which is supposed to influence the corporate
innovation activities, we first use a dummy variable continuous R&D. If a firm continu-
ously performs R&D surely impacts on the characteristics of the innovation as displayed
in the innovativeness variable as well as on firm’s patenting. R&D performing firms
are more vulnerable to knowledge expropriation and may have a higher probability to
generate a completely new product. Furthermore, we account for intermediate prod-
ucts because in this case the customers tend to be a clearly cut, mostly small group.
Hence, the market potential for this product may be clearer compared to final prod-
ucts. At the same time customers are more important, hence, may exert more (buyer)
power. With respect to the newly generated knowledge, these innovation may suffer a
higher exposure to expropriation and higher risk of granting a dependent innovation/use.
Moreover, Blundell et al. (1995) proposing a dynamic feedback model with fixed effects
approximated by information of pre-sample periods state that unobservable permanent
heterogeneity is an important feature of empirical models of innovation. As our data set
is cross-sectional we try to control for heterogeneity in patenting experience by including
the dummy patent before. This variable indicates whether the firm uses patents which
have been filed before the foundation of the firm. For example, a founder could have
discovered a new drug during his PhD and then try to commercialize his discovery by
founding a startup.1
The characteristics of the founder team are crucial for young firms, e.g. they may
determine the absorptive capacity of the firm, in particular, during the first years. First,
we control for the number of the founding team members (team). We conjecture that
a higher number of team members increases the availability of necessary abilities and
skills, particularly regarding management and marketing. This reasoning is corroborated
by the theoretical work of Lazear (2004) who finds that entrepreneurs or entrepreneurial
teams are more generalists with regard to abilities than specialists (jacks-of-all-trades).
Hence, starting a business requires a balanced skill portfolio. In this respect, building up
entrepreneurial teams may be necessary to cope with the relevant portfolio of abilities.
In line with this argument, we further include several indicator reflecting the abilities
and skills available in the team. We include indicators regarding prior knowledge and
experience of the founder team which are assumed to influence the identification, as-
similation and exploitation of external knowledge, e.g. generated by research facilities
(Cohen, Levinthal (1989)). The dummy m graduate reflecting that at least one founder
holds a PhD or university degree. Besides the educational level achieved the field in
which the education was completed is important. So we account for technical degrees
(m technical). Additionally, an indicator showing whether at least one member of the
initial management team has previous industry experience either as an employee or as
1This variable we only include in the patent estimation. For the investigation of innovativeness, we are
not able to use this indicator because all firms with patent experience indicate that they developed
the methods and technologies by themselves. This finding is quite intuitive, since patents are defined
by the newness of the invention.
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an entrepreneur (m indexp) is included. This variable also reflects that some abilities
are available in the team which can only be achieved by working in an enterprise or
founding a firm and which cannot be learned otherwise.
A third group of controls are firm characteristics. First, we account for ownership
structure, i.e. separation of ownership and control, which may influence a firm’s risk
exposure. m majority displays unit value if the management at time of firm establish-
ment held majority stake. According to the principle agency theory, managers who do
not own the firm may act in a way that serves themselves and not the firm, e.g. they
could be reluctant to invest in risky projects like innovation projects because they may
be fired in case of failure. Moreover, innovation often depends on spillover effects in
which firm may benefit from specific research facilities. In order to account for such
effects, the distance to the nearest university or public research facility (log(distance))
is included in the regressions. Furthermore, we include two indicators concerning the
credit rating index reflecting a good and a medium rating. The rating is supposed to
display firms’ risk exposure and the access to debt markets2. Other firm characteris-
tics that are typically linked to innovation activities include firm size, which is included
as the logarithm of the number of employees at founding date (initial size). Further-
more, foundation year dummies are included to reflect the cyclical differences at the time
when the business was started. All firms have been founded during a period in which
the German technology-oriented sectors have experienced an extraordinary boom period
1997 to 2000 and a downturn period afterwards. Finally, industry dummies (high-tech,
medium-to-high-tech, ICT, software) are also included.
As stated before, we want to identify the causal effect of VC financing on innovation
activities. As VC financing is suspected to be endogenous we need to find exclusion
restrictions for identification. These instruments need to be related with VC financing
while having no effect on innovation activities. The variables we propose as instruments
reflect regional specificities as those may influence the provision and accessibility of
financing but at the same time should not influence a firm’s innovation activities. Hence,
we include two indicators regarding a characterization of the county. We conjecture that
VC investors tend to invest in startups located in more densely populated areas. So
we include two indicators showing whether it is a metropolis or a rural area. In line
with Zucker et al. (1998), we further account for the availability and experience of VC
investors in the county in that we include a variable displaying the share of early stage
startups having received VC financing which are located in the same county and are
associated with the same 3-digit NACE industry.
2 The rating indicators are based on the rating index provided by Creditreform. The index ranges
from 1 to 5, whereas 1 is the best and 5 the worst rating. Since the rating index is not a metric
variable, we include two indicator variables. Czarnitzki and Kraft (2007) state that Creditreform
clusters the rating index in classes. We refer to good rating if the rating index ranges between 1.9
and 2.5 and medium rating between 2.5 and 3.5.
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4 Empirical results
To investigate the impact of VC financing on patenting we use count data models
(Greene, 2003, Winkelmann, 1994). However, over 75% of the firms report that they
do not make use of own patents, i.e. the patent variable exhibits excess zeros. Two
models may be applicable with excess zeros: the hurdle and the zero-inflated model. In
the patent case, the zero-inflated model is preferred because the zero patents may stem
from two different sources: First, the firm is not innovative, and thus will never file a
patent and second, the firm is innovative, but has not filed a patent yet, because either
the outcome of the innovation process is not patentable or the firm has decided to keep
the knowledge secret.3 The intuition of the zero-inflated models is to simultaneously
estimate a count data and a binary model reflecting whether the zero outcome observed
stems from or is not part of a Poisson (Negbin) process (see Cameron and Trivedi, 1998,
pp.125-128).
Table 4 depicts the results for a zero-inflated Poisson model with robust standard
errors and a zero-inflated Negative Binomial model. The Vuong tests confirm that the
zero-inflated versions of count data indeed fit the data better than the non-zero-inflated
ones. We chose a logit type model to represent the zero outcomes. The coefficients and
the unconditional average marginal effects can be found in Tables 3 and 4.
< Insert Table 3 about here. >
< Insert Table 4 about here. >
The results show that venture capital funding has a positive impact on patenting, i.e.
the VC-backing can be associated with an increasing number of patents. This result con-
firms Hypothesis 1 that VC financing spurs firms’ patenting activities even if accounting
for excess zeros.
Since the literature provides arguments and empirical evidence for endogeneity prob-
lems in the context of VC financing and firms’ innovation activities, we now try to take
the endogeneity of VC financing into account. Particularly in the context of patenting,
Kortum and Lerner (2000) state that patents may serve as certification for firm’s quality
to potential VC investors, i.e. patents may help to attract VC with the consequence
that firms wishing to get VC are more prone to patent their inventions. Thus, endo-
geneity arises because it is not clear whether the firm is innovative because it is able
to bridge the funding gap by receiving venture capital or whether VC companies select
3In the context of the underlying data set one might argue that all high-tech firms are potential
innovators so that all firms are potentially innovative and able to patent so that a hurdle model
would be appropriate. But the definition of high-tech firms is based on the industry-level and
considers the industry R&D intensity, i.e. it is probable that the data set includes firms which will
never be innovative and hence will not file any patents.
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firms which have a high probability to be innovative. In line with the selection argument
is the fact that a rigorous due diligence process takes place preceding VC investments,
which strongly influences the VC decision regarding investment opportunities. This ar-
gumentation resembles very much a selection problem, i.e. receiving VC financing is
not random. Furthermore, endogeneity may arise because of the existence of variables
that are correlated with innovative activities – both patenting and innovativeness – and
VC financing. Such factors can be observable, like the educational background of the
founding managers, or unobservable, like the quality of an innovative idea, a prototype
or a new product.
Terza (1998) proposes a FIML framework for the estimation of count data model with
a binary endogenous regressor. Suppose that the probability density function of the
count dependent variable is f(y|x, d, ²), i.e. it depends on the covariates x, the binary
(endogenous) variable d and the random (heterogeneity) component ². The switching
variable d can be represented by the index function I(zα + ν > 0).
The resulting likelihood function is:
L =
n∏
i=1
1√
pi
∫ ∞
−∞
f(yi|xi, zi, di, ²)
[
diΦ
∗
i (²) + (1− d)(1− Φ∗i (²))
]
exp(−ξ2)dξ.
For Poisson model:
f(yi|xi, zi, di,
√
2σξ) =
exp(xiβ + ²)
yexp
[−exp(xiβ + ²)]
y!
,
For Negbin model:
f(yi|xi, zi, di,
√
2σξ) =
Γ(yi + (1/α))
Γ(1/α)Γ(yi + 1)
(
αexp(xiβ + ²)
)yi(1− αexp(xiβ + ²))(yi+1/α),
with ² =
√
2σξ.
Since this likelihood cannot be evaluated in closed form it has to be approximated by
using the Gauss-Hermite quadrature (see Butler and Moffitt (1982), Miranda (2004)).
The results of the FIML estimation of the endogenous switching Poisson and Nega-
tive Binomial models are presented in Table 5. The F-test of joint significance of the
instruments is highly significant which is a hint that the instruments are strong. With
respect to VC financing we find that if we control for its endogeneity the positive and
significant effect on firms’ patenting behavior is confirmed. Thus, we can confirm our
hypothesis regarding the link of VC financing and patenting activities. Whether this ef-
fect also hints at an increasing impact on firms’ innovation activities cannot be assessed
(see Kortum, Lerner (2000))
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< Insert Table 5 about here. >
Regarding the control variables we find that firms performing continuously R&D have a
higher probability to file more patent applications. We also confirm that previous patent-
ing experience also has a positive impact. This may be an indication that technology-
oriented firms are highly heterogeneous regarding their patenting behavior. As firms
producing intermediate products reveal a positive effect on patent application we sus-
pect that those firms may be subject to a higher expropriation risk.
Concerning possible spillover effects and absorptive capacities we find positive effects of
team members who hold a university or PhD degree and who have a technical education.
Furthermore, the distance to research facilities is negative showing that proximity plays
a positive role for spillover translating in a higher patenting activity. However, team size
and industry experience seem to have a detrimental effect on patenting activities.
As expected larger firms display a higher propensity to patent and medium rating has
a negative impact. Both effects may indicate that firms with sufficient financial resources
are more prone to patent as ratings may be used by banks as a source of information on
the firm.
To test our second hypothesis, we run regression with the innovativeness indicator.
Since innovativeness is measured as a categorical variable with four exclusive categories,
we estimate a multinomial logit model. As before the endogeneity of VC financing has
to be taken into account. In order to correct for the endogeneity bias in the multinomial
regressions, we estimate a FIML model which enables us to correct for this bias. We
use an approach proposed by Terza (2002). In this framework, the underlying latent
model is a conventional multinomial model (see McFadden (1973)) for the categorical
variable y where the binary (endogenous) variable d is expressed as the index function
d = I(zα+ ν > 0), i.e. ν captures the combined effects of the unobservable confounders
which may be correlated to y and d. z is a vector of instrumental variables including all
exogenous variables of the multinomial logit and the identifying variables. The condi-
tional expected values, representing the multinomial logit and simultaneously correcting
for the endogeneity of d, are
E(y0|d, x, ν) = 1
1 +
∑3
r=1 exp(dγr + xβr + νθr)
E(ym|d, x, ν) = exp(dγm + xβm + νθm)
1 +
∑3
r=1 exp(dγr + xβr + νθr)
,
for m=1,2,3. The corresponding likelihood function that is maximized using FIML is
L(α, γm, βm, θm) =
n∏
i=1
di
∫ ∞
−ziα
P yimim φ(ν)dν + (1− di)
∫ −ziα
−∞
P yimim φ(ν)dν,
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with i = 1, ..., n and where Pm = E(ym|d, x, ν). This estimator has no closed-form
so that numerical integration procedures apply here. Terza uses in his program code4
the Gauss-Legendre quadrature for closed integrals for which 12 is supposed to be the
“quasi-infinity”limit of the integrals. We program this FIML estimator by approximating
the one-sidedly bounded integral with the Gauss-Legendre quadrature. This quadrature
formula numerically integrates integrals which are bounded two-sidedly. Therefore, we
adopt the procedure used by Terza and adopt a number reflecting the “quasi-infinity”.
The results of the endogeneity-corrected multinomial logit are displayed in Table 6.
Venture capital has a significantly positive effect on firm’s innovativeness, particularly
on the probability of using new self-developed methods and technologies and on using
innovative combinations with respect to using known combinations of tried and tested
methods and technologies, so that in this respect hypothesis 2 is confirmed. This re-
sult suggests that if the VC invests the firm is more probably innovative either by
self-developing technologies or by using innovative combinations which are presumably
combined by the firm itself.
< Insert Table 6 about here. >
We find positive effects of continuous R&D activities on all degrees of innovation. The
positive effect of continuous R&D on the use of externally developed technologies may, for
example, reflect that researching firms may incorporate new externally developed process
innovations5. Furthermore, a positive impact is found for firms with a management team
characterized by the presence of at least one technical degree, thus the importance of
technical background for innovative activities is confirmed. A technical degree also
seems to be needed to assess the usefulness of technological innovations, because we
also find a positive effect on the probability of using new technologies developed by
others with respect to being non-innovative. University degrees as such seem to be not
important which is surprising as self-development of technologies supposedly linked to
the fact that an academic background may enable the entrepreneurs to get in touch
with cutting-edge technologies and to be able to refine them and develop a totally new
product or process. Firms which are initially classified to have a medium risk display a
lower probability of developing new technologies themselves with respect to being non-
innovative. Interestingly, there is no significant effect of good rating compared to bad
rating. This may hint at the fact that medium ratings may lower the chance for business
mandates or contacts. e.g. banks may refer to external ratings to confirm the chance and
risk profile of their investment opportunities. Interestingly our results show that if firms
are more distant to research facilities their probability of using innovative combinations
of known methods and technologies increases.
4 We are very grateful to Prof. Terza for providing the Gauss program code which was particularly
helpful for determining the numerical integration procedure, e.g. the adoption of quasi infinity, and
for transferring the log likelihood in a STATA code.
5 The question in the survey was intended to also capture process innovation as it also asks for methods.
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5 Concluding remarks
This paper investigates the impact of venture capital financing on innovation activities
of young firms in technology-oriented sectors. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a link
between innovation activities and VC funding exists. However, the causal direction is
unclear. The literature discusses and provides evidence for both effects. Hence, endo-
geneity issues have to be taken into account.
We use two different measures to reflect innovation activities. The first is the number
of patent applications which is traditional means to reflect innovation output. We only
take into account the patent applications after firm foundation. Furthermore, we use a
variable on the innovativeness. This categorical variable displays the degree of novelty
of the technologies applied by firms and its developer. It shows whether a firm devel-
oped new methods itself or mandates an external party to develop those new methods.
Furthermore, it reveals whether tried and tested methods have been combined in a new
manner.
Moreover, in this paper we explicitly account for the endogeneity issue of VC financing.
For both models we use full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) methods (see Terza
(1998, 2002)). We find a positive effect of VC investment on the number of patent
applications and the use of self-developed methods and technologies. Concluding our
results show that VC financing spurs innovation in terms of patent applications as well
as the innovation’s newness.
Both of our innovation indicators only provide a rough approximation of innovation ac-
tivities. Different measures of innovation inputs like R&D activities would be interesting
to look at. This is left to future research.
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Tables
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the link between VC fi-
nancing and innovative activities (both models)
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Dependent variable
patents after 0.498 2.349 0 33
Explanatory variables
venture capital 0.077 0.266 0 1
continuous R&D 0.336 0.473 0 1
patent before 0.042 0.201 0 1
intermediate 0.408 0.492 0 1
log(team members) 0.565 0.544 0 1.792
m graduate 0.645 0.479 0 1
m technical 0.597 0.491 0 1
m indexp 0.761 0.427 0 1
m majority 0.276 0.447 0 1
log(initial size) 1.090 0.833 -0.693 3.807
good rating 0.292 0.455 0 1
medium rating 0.574 0.495 0 1
log(distance) 1.667 1.903 -2.303 4.552
East Germany 0.157 0.364 0 1
Instruments
earlystage 0.017 0.050 0.000 0.667
metropolis 0.118 0.322 0 1
rural 0.170 0.376 0 1
Number of observations 833
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Table 3: Coefficients of zero-inflated count models
Model ZIP ZINB
Model Poisson Inflation Negbin Inflation
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(Std.Err.) (Std.Err.) (Std.Err.) (Std.Err.)
venture capital 0.351** -1.460*** 1.182*** 3.201
(0.149) (0.427) (0.395) (31.313)
cont. R&D -0.022 -2.025*** 1.024*** -100.768
(0.162) (0.313) (0.278) (68.488)
patent before 0.229 2.327***
(0.163) (0.429)
intermediate -0.074 -0.362 -0.385 -165.312
(0.150) (0.286) (0.276) (111.944)
log(team) -0.188 0.210 0.481 83.721
(0.149) (0.306) (0.322) (66.615)
m graduate 0.742*** 0.034 1.394*** 105.046
(0.221) (0.367) (0.349) (72.262)
m technical -0.431** -0.356 -0.843*** -128.707
(0.169) (0.312) (0.307) (87.725)
m indexp -0.403*** 0.307 -0.424 -63.425
(0.141) (0.299) (0.324) (46.516)
m majority 0.150 -0.191 0.836** 111.379
(0.152) (0.323) (0.333) (83.999)
log(initial size) 0.261*** -0.159 0.195 -15.679
(0.076) (0.173) (0.167) (16.931)
good rating -0.172 0.006 0.853* 129.934
(0.215) (0.457) (0.456) (96.447)
medium rating 0.211 0.220 0.270 55.842
(0.183) (0.407) (0.368) (58.732)
log(distance) -0.080** -0.042 0.077 10.307
(0.032) (0.074) (0.075) (8.723)
east -0.101 0.171
(0.146) (0.354)
constant 1.644*** 3.655*** -1.495** -13.216
(0.357) (0.721) (0.745) (44.754)
α 3.136***
(0.539)
industry dummies included included
foundation years included included
log Likelihood -486.25 -423.10
LR test of α = 0 199.26***
Vuong test 3.64*** 6.34***
χ2(all) a 192.50*** 127.72***
χ2(industries) b 5.45 8.27*
χ2(foundation years) b 61.40*** 55.78
Number of observations 833 833
*** (**, *) indicate significance of 1 % (5 %, 10 %) respectively.
This table depicts the coefficients and standard errors of a zero-inflated Poisson and
Negative Binomial models.
a χ2(all) displays an χ2-test of the joint significance of all variables.
b χ2(industries) and χ2(foundation years) display χ2-tests on the joint significance of
industry and foundation year dummies. Four industry dummies for high-tech 1, high-
tech 2, hardware and software are included.
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Table 4: Unconditional marginal effects of
zero-inflated count data models re-
garding patenting activities
Model ZIP ZINB
Marg.Eff. Marg.Eff.
(Std.Err.) (Std.Err.)
venture capital 0.609*** 1.186*
(0.143) (0.690)
cont. R&D 0.600*** 1.090**
(0.105) (0.556)
patent before 0.110 2.340*
(0.076) (1.261)
intermediate 0.074 -0.289
(0.097) (0.421)
log(team) -0.154 0.434
(0.106) (0.432)
m graduate 0.346** 1.339*
(0.136) (0.735)
m technical -0.100 -0.771
(0.108) (0.525)
m indexp -0.286** -0.389
(0.114) (0.358)
m majority 0.130 0.774
(0.111) (0.537)
log(initial size) 0.173*** 0.205
(0.063) (0.174)
good rating -0.084 0.781
(0.151) (0.716)
medium rating 0.035 0.238
(0.133) (0.412)
log(distance) -0.026 0.071
(0.025) (0.089)
east -0.048 0.172
(0.070) (0.378)
industry dummies included included
foundation years included included
*** (**, *) indicate significance of 1 % (5 %, 10 %) re-
spectively.
This table depicts the unconditional average marginal ef-
fects of a zero-inflated Poisson with robust standard errors
and Negative Binomial models. Marginal effects of dummy
variables are interpreted as discrete change from 0 to 1.
Standard errors are obtained by using the delta method.
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Table 5: Results for FIML count data model accounting for endogeneity
of VC financing
Model Poisson Negative Binomial
Patent Switching Patent Switching
equation equation equation equation
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(Std.Err.) (Std.Err.) (Std.Err.) (Std.Err.)
venture capital 0.290 3.430***
(0.191) (0.234)
cont. R&D 1.628*** 0.328** 1.759*** 0.341**
(0.189) (0.158) (0.197) (0.156)
patent before 3.285*** 0.744** 3.328*** 0.923***
(0.239) (0.290) (0.241) (0.282)
intermediate 0.488*** 0.311** 0.502*** 0.328**
(0.138) (0.153) (0.133) (0.152)
log(team) -0.566*** 0.305* -0.597*** 0.327**
(0.161) (0.157) (0.156) (0.154)
m graduate 1.071*** 0.513** 1.097*** 0.514**
(0.220) (0.216) (0.189) (0.215)
m technical 0.175 0.058 0.619*** 0.029
(0.176) (0.158) (0.182) (0.156)
m indexp -0.577*** 0.126 -0.556*** 0.134
(0.169) (0.192) (0.161) (0.187)
m majority 0.314** -0.287 0.085 -0.270
(0.152) (0.201) (0.151) (0.195)
log(initial size) 0.234*** 0.084 0.515*** 0.075
(0.081) (0.097) (0.077) (0.096)
good rating -0.934*** 0.248 -0.301 0.193
(0.230) (0.261) (0.216) (0.253)
medium rating -0.634*** 0.172 -0.518** 0.135
(0.221) (0.234) (0.208) (0.226)
log(distance) -0.137*** -0.063 -0.087** -0.052
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.038)
east -0.037 0.148 -0.133 0.146
(0.166) (0.189) (0.167) (0.186)
earlystage 2.380** 2.316**
(1.104) (1.056)
metropolis 0.492** 0.461**
(0.199) (0.196)
rural 0.010 0.002
(0.228) (0.222)
constant -3.748*** -3.140*** -4.941*** -3.215***
(0.437) (0.475) (0.517) (0.470)
industry dummies included included
foundation years included included
σˆ 0.873*** 0.974***
(0.055) (0.054)
ρˆ 0.204 -0.547***
(0.131) (0.123)
αˆ -17.861
(550.068)
Log likelihood -587.90 -577.07
χ2(all) a 589.93*** 590.89***
χ2(instruments) b 11.56*** 11.25**
Number of observations 833 833
*** (**, *) indicate significance of 1 % (5 %, 10 %) respectively.
This table depicts coefficients of an endogenous switching count model which corrects for the
endogeneity of the binary variable VC financing in the count models by estimating simulta-
neously a Poisson (Negbin) model and a probit type VC equation by using a full-information
maximum likelihood approach according to Terza (1998).
a
χ2(all) displays a test of the joint significance of all variables.
b
χ2(instruments) displays a test of the joint significance of instrumental variables in the VC
equation.
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Table 6: Results for FIML multinomial logit accounting for endo-
geneity of VC financing
Multinomial logit for innovativeness Switching eq.
Category self others innovative
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(Std.Err.) (Std.Err.) (Std.Err.) (Std.Err.)
venture capital 4.073** 2.440 9.048***
(1.705) (1.649) (1.787)
cont. R&D 1.603*** 1.305** 3.893*** 0.291**
(0.594) (0.552) (0.706) (0.138)
intermediate 0.264 0.417 0.585 0.442***
(0.403) (0.362) (0.485) (0.129)
log(team) 0.114 -0.132 0.642 0.405***
(0.412) (0.368) (0.506) (0.126)
m graduate 0.135 -0.398 0.537 1.033***
(0.471) (0.399) (0.616) (0.188)
m technical 1.005** 0.741** 1.068** 0.084
(0.420) (0.373) (0.504) (0.146)
m indexp 0.544 -0.111 0.396 0.097
(0.459) (0.388) (0.558) (0.147)
m majority 0.328 -0.375 0.726 -0.352**
(0.476) (0.410) (0.584) (0.151)
log(initial size) -0.255 -0.119 -0.187 -0.036
(0.248) (0.221) (0.301) (0.082)
good rating -0.620 0.043 -0.935 0.358*
(0.692) (0.621) (0.838) (0.212)
medium rating -1.435** -0.492 -1.729** 0.153
(0.681) (0.625) (0.801) (0.177)
log(distance) 0.101 0.087 0.291** -0.062
(0.114) (0.105) (0.138) (0.039)
east 0.760 0.724 0.336 0.112
(0.568) (0.516) (0.689) (0.160)
patent before 0.596***
(0.189)
earlystage 1.068
(0.917)
metropolis 0.511***
(0.161)
rural 0.037
(0.152)
constant 0.790 1.145 -1.185 -3.561***
(1.199) (1.122) (1.500) (0.379)
industry dummies included included
foundation years included included
νˆ -2.644*** -2.090** -4.716***
(0.943) (0.929) (0.941)
Log likelihood -1242.18
χ2(instruments) a 12.22***
Number of observations 833
*** (**, *) indicate significance of 1 % (5 %, 10 %) respectively.
This table depicts coefficients of an endogenous switching multinomial logit model as
proposed in Terza (2002) which corrects for the endogeneity of the binary variable VC
financing in the multinomial logit by estimating simultaneously a multinomial logit
model and a probit type VC equation by full-information maximum likelihood.
a
χ2(instruments) displays a test of the joint significance of instrumental variables in
the VC equation. Clearly, the instruments are jointly significant.
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